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1 Introduction
Commitment is one of the central issues in bargaining. A player's bargaining
power reects the extent to which he can commit himself to insist on some
share of the available surplus. This depends on how credibly he can threaten
the opponent not to accept a less favorable division. As Schelling (1960)
has pointed out, a player may enhance his degree of commitment through
a contract with a third-party. In a bargaining situation such a contract
may be benecial because the \use of a bargaining agent aects the power
of commitment" (p. 29). The basic idea is that the player signs a public
contract with an intermediary to bargain on his behalf. Since the incentives
of the intermediary are inuenced by the contract, the payo structure of
the bargaining game is altered and so the bargaining power of the opponent
may be reduced.
In the recent literature on contract design, however, Schelling's third-
party device has become somewhat discredited because it fails to consider
the possibility of renegotiation (see, for example, Dewatripont (1988) and
Green (1990)). Unless communication is impossible, the contract between
the intermediary and his employer is not irrevocable. The intermediary may
contact his employer to renegotiate his contract when he feels that otherwise
an agreement with the other party cannot be reached. Since the other party
will take this into account, it may seem as if renegotiation would erode the
commitment eect of delegation.
In this paper, we investigate this issue in a strategic model of delegated
bargaining and renegotiation. Our model builds on the alternating oers
game of Rubinstein (1982). In this game the bargainers are impatient and
a player's bargaining power depends on how fast he can make a counterpro-
posal after rejecting an oer from the opponent. We extend this framework
by allowing one of the two parties to hire an intermediary. More specically,
in Section 2 we consider a seller who can either bargain face-to-face with a
prospective buyer or hire an intermediary to bargain on her behalf. In the
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latter case, she signs a contract with the delegate that species his compen-
sation as a function of the agreement with the buyer. The delegate is thus
provided with an incentive scheme and chooses a bargaining strategy that
maximizes his own payo.
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If the intermediary's compensation is not rene-
gotiable, it turns out that the seller can appropriate the entire gains from
trade through delegation.
To introduce the possibility of renegotiation, we enable the delegate to
interrupt his negotiation with the buyer in order to communicate with the
seller. After an oer from the buyer, he has the option to contact the seller
and to propose a change in his compensation scheme. Such a proposal may be
acceptable for the seller if it reduces the delay until an agreement is reached.
Since the seller cannot make herself unavailable for her delegate, hiring an
intermediary eectively leads to a three-person bargaining problem. The
solution of this problem depends not only on how fast the intermediary and
the buyer can exchange oers and counteroers but also on the speed of
communication between the intermediary and the seller.
Our analysis reveals that the gains from delegated bargaining depend on
two dierent types of communication costs: First, intermediation involves a
delegation cost which reects the time that the seller needs for contacting
an intermediary and designing the delegation contract. Second, there is
a renegotiation cost. This cost is incurred when the intermediary spends
some time to switch back and forth between the buyer and his employer
to renegotiate his compensation. The renegotiation cost turns out to be
crucial for the commitment eect of delegated bargaining: Unless the cost
of delegation is prohibitive, the seller gains from employing a bargaining
agent only if renegotiation is suciently time consuming. The time cost of
renegotiation appears thus as a natural measure of the commitment eect of
contracting with a third party. Importantly, this commitment eect remains
1
In the terminology of Fershtman and Kalai (1997), this type of intermediation amounts
to `incentive delegation' as opposed to `instructive delegation', where the delegate's be-
havior is regulated by the contract.
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positive even in the limit when the players become innitely patient. In
fact, the delegation cost vanishes in this limit and so delegation is always
protable for the seller.
Our result shows that renegotiation does not fully eliminate the com-
mitment eect of delegation in a strategic model of bargaining. This may
explain why intermediation is used in many bargaining situations. A typical
example is the housing market, where real estate agents deal with potential
customers on behalf of the owner. In many other markets, however, interme-
diation plays at most a minor role. In Section 3 we extend our model to a
simple search market environment with a large set of potential buyers. Here
we show that the gains from delegation are inversely related to the eciency
of search. Indeed, when the seller's time cost of searching for a buyer is su-
ciently small, it is never protable for her to delegate search and bargaining
to a third party. Her ability to search for another trading partner acts as
a substitute for increasing her bargaining power through a delegate. As a
result, intermediation does not occur in a highly competitive market with
small search frictions.
There are a few papers that investigate Schelling's idea of increasing bar-
gaining power through a bargaining agent.
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Fershtman, Judd and Kalai
(1991) provide a general analysis of the payos that can be achieved through
contractual delegation. In a model of collective bargaining, Haller and Holden
(1997) investigate the commitment eects of a ratication requirement which
stipulates that the agreement reached by the delegate is subject to approval
by his principals. These papers, however, presume that contracts are irre-
vocable and do not address the issue of renegotiation. To our knowledge,
only Green (1990) studies delegation and renegotiation in a bargaining con-
text. He adopts an axiomatic approach to derive the bargaining solution
and concludes that with renegotiation there are no gains from contractual
2
A number of papers discusses contractual commitments in other contexts; see, for
example, Aghion and Bolton (1987), Brander and Lewis (1986), and Fershtman and Judd
(1987).
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delegation. We arrive at a dierent conclusion because in our strategic ap-
proach the (time) costs of negotiations determine the bargaining solution.
It is perhaps worth mentioning that commitment through delegation may
also be limited when the delegation contract is not publicly observable. This
issue, which is analyzed in Fershtman and Kalai (1997), is not addressed in
our setting where contracts are assumed to be public.
Finally, Section 3 of this paper is related to Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1987) and Bester (1995). Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) study intermedi-
ation and bargaining in a random matching market. Yet, their model does
not consider the potential commitment eects of delegation. Instead, inter-
mediation occurs because the intermediary enjoys a comparative advantage
in making contacts and, thereby, speeds up the process of exchange. This dif-
fers from our model where the intermediary uses the same search technology
as the seller. Bester (1995) proposes a bargaining model of nancial inter-
mediation which is based on the incentive eects of delegation. His model,
however, does not contain a strategic description of the bargaining process
and fails to address the problem of renegotiation.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we study the gains from
delegation in a bilateral monopoly. Here we present a strategic model of
bargaining, delegation and renegotiation. To study the commitment eects
of delegation, we solve this model for its subgame perfect equilibrium in
stationary strategies. Section 3 introduces a simple search technology and
extends the analysis of the previous section to a random matching market.
Section 4 oers concluding remarks and discusses possible extensions.
2 Bilateral Monopoly
2.1 Bargaining and Delegation
We begin our analysis with the simplest possible case, where a single seller
and a single buyer bargain over the sale of an indivisible good. The buyer's
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valuation and the seller's reservation price are normalized to one and zero,
respectively. They both have linear utilities for money and discount future
payos by the common discount factor  2 (0; 1): That is, if they agree to
trade at time t for the price p, the payos are 
t
p and 
t
(1  p) for the seller
and buyer, respectively.
To study the commitment eects of delegation, we compare the outcomes
of two dierent bargaining games. In the rst setting, bargaining between
the seller and the buyer proceeds face-to-face according to the benchmark,
alternating oers model of Rubinstein (1982). In this game, the seller makes
the rst oer so that he gets the payo 1=(1 + ): In the second setting, the
seller uses the option to employ an agent to negotiate on her behalf. Since
the agent is bound by the (public) contract signed with his employer, his
bargaining behavior depends on his compensation scheme. This, in princi-
ple, translates into a larger bargaining power making the idea of delegation
attractive to the seller. We assume that the utility function of the agent is
the same as those of the seller and the buyer, i.e. he discounts future mon-
etary payos by the factor : Therefore, the crucial issues, which determine
the success of delegation, are the compensation oered to the intermediary
and the commitment to this contract.
2.2 Delegation with Commitment
For this section, we assume that there is full commitment to the contract
signed between the seller and the intermediary. After the compensation
scheme has been agreed upon and made public, the intermediary and the
buyer engage in a standard Rubinstein alternating oers negotiation, where
the intermediary makes the rst oer. The most straightforward way for the
seller to use the commitment power of delegated bargaining is a compensation
scheme which requires the agent to pay her a xed amount f 2 [0; 1] whenever
trade occurs. We will show that this scheme enables the seller to extract all
the surplus. In addition, it does not require a verication of the outcome of
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the negotiation between the agent and the buyer. When the intermediary
and the buyer agree at time t on the price p; their payos are 
t
(p  f) and

t
(1  p), respectively. The seller obtains 
t
f:
For a given contract f; the solution of the bargaining game between the
intermediary and the buyer is familiar from the standard Rubinstein game:
The equilibrium is stationary so that the intermediary oers some price p
I
;
whenever it his turn to make a proposal. Similarly, the buyer always of-
fers some price p
B
: The buyer accepts a price p if an only if p  p
I
; the
intermediary accepts a price if and only if p  p
B
: The prices p
I
and p
B
satisfy
p
B
  f = (p
I
  f); 1  p
I
= (1  p
B
); (1)
so that each party is indierent between accepting a proposal and making
a counteroer at the next stage. The unique solution of these equilibrium
conditions is
p^
I
=
1 +  f
1 + 
; p^
B
=
 + f
1 + 
: (2)
Since the agreement is reached in the rst round of bargaining, the seller's
equilibrium payo is simply f: The intermediary and the buyer realize the
payos p^
I
  f = (1  f)=(1 + ) and 1  p^
I
= (1  f)=(1 + ); respectively.
We assume that the intermediary's outside option payo is zero so that
he accepts any contract under which he expects a non-negative payo.
3
The
seller, therefore, can appropriate the entire surplus by setting f = 1: Thus the
use of a bargaining agent appears as a rather eective commitment device.
At least this is true when the contract f cannot be renegotiated. To see that
there is possibly an incentive for renegotiation, suppose that in some subgame
the buyer makes an oer slightly below p^
B
: Rather than rejecting this oer,
the intermediary may nd it protable to contact the seller to propose a
reduction in f: Indeed, the seller may accept to modify the initial contract
in order not to delay an agreement. Of course, the gains from renegotiation
3
This assumption is without loss of generality: If the intermediary had a positive
reservation value, the seller would optimally compensate him by an up-front payment.
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depend on the cost of communication between the intermediary and the seller.
To study the limitations of delegating bargaining without commitment, we
introduce a formal model of intermediation and renegotiation in the following
section.
2.3 Delegation and Renegotiation
Unless renegotiation is too costly, there may be room for a Pareto improve-
ment. Therefore, in general, we should not expect the full commitment result
of the previous section to prevail. Instead, depending on the actual cost of
renegotiation, some intermediate levels of commitment should arise. To stay
as closely as possible within the framework of the Rubinstein model, we
model the cost of renegotiation by the time delay that is required for com-
munication between the intermediary and the seller. The extensive form of
our game is described by the following stages:
Stage 0: The seller decides whether to employ an intermediary. If she bar-
gains directly, she expects the payo 1=(1+):Otherwise, it takes herM
time units to contact the intermediary and to negotiate the delegation
contract. She chooses a contract, f
S
; which requires the intermediary
to pay f
S
to her after any sale, independently of the transaction price.
The agent accepts or rejects. In case of acceptance, stage 1 begins.
If the agent rejects f
S
; the seller bargains directly with the buyer and
obtains the payo 
M
=(1+ ): In this case, the intermediary's payo is
his outside option, which is normalized to zero.
Stage 1: The intermediary proposes a price, p
I
, to the buyer: If the buyer
accepts, they trade and the game ends. Otherwise, it proceeds to the
next stage after a delay of one time unit.
Stage 2: The buyer makes a counteroer p
B
: The intermediary either accepts,
rejects or goes for renegotiation. If he accepts, they trade and the game
ends. If he rejects, the game returns to stage 1 after one time unit.
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Finally, if the intermediary goes for renegotiation, stage 3 is entered
after T=2 time units.
Stage 3: The intermediary proposes a new contract, f
I
: If the seller accepts,
it takes the intermediary T=2 time units to return to the buyer and
to sell the good at the price previously proposed by the buyer. Then
the intermediary pays f
I
to seller. If the seller rejects, the old contract
stays valid and stage 1 is entered, after a delay of 1 + T=2 time units.
4
Our model distinguishes between three types of time costs. In stage 0;
there is a delegation cost ofM time units. In stages 1 and 2 the delay between
oers and counteroers represents the cost of bargaining, which is normalized
to unity. The cost of renegotiation in stages 2 and 3 is represented by the T
time units that it takes the intermediary to switch back and forth between
the buyer and the seller.
We now derive a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary, that is, his-
tory independent, strategies.
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In fact, we show that such equilibrium strate-
gies can be described by a six-tuple (f

S
; p

I
; p

B
; p
r
B
; p
a
B
; f

I
) with the following
interpretation:
- In stage 0, the seller proposes f

S
: The intermediary accepts any f
S
 f

S
;
he rejects any f
S
> f

S
:
- In stage 1, the intermediary proposes p

I
: The buyer accepts any price
p
I
 p

I
; he rejects any p
I
> p

I
:
- In stage 2, the buyer proposes p

B
: The intermediary rejects any price
p
B
< p
r
B
; he goes for renegotiation if p
r
B
 p
B
< p
a
B
; he accepts any
p
B
> p
a
B
:
4
Here we follow the standard interpretation of the alternating oers model: After
rejecting an oer it takes one time unit to formulate a counteroer.
5
Note that a player responds optimally by using a stationary strategy when the other
players employ stationary strategies. Thus we are not restricting the strategy space but
merely performing an equilibrium selection.
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- In stage 3, the intermediary proposes f

I
: The seller accepts any f
I
 f

I
;
he rejects any f
I
< f

I
:
Indeed, (re)negotiation between the seller and her agent is always success-
ful in equilibrium. If the intermediary were to reject the seller's proposal, the
seller would strictly prefer to negotiate directly with the buyer. If the seller
were to reject the intermediary's renegotiation proposal, the buyer would
strictly prefer to make an acceptable oer to the intermediary in the rst
place (in fact, he would accept the intermediary's oer).
Consequently, the seller's optimal take-it-or-leave-it oer is the one which
extracts all the surplus from her agent. Therefore, we have the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 The intermediary makes zero prot in equilibrium.
Moreover, we obtain that no renegotiation occurs on the equilibrium path.
Lemma 2 The intermediary's oer is always accepted by the buyer in equi-
librium. Therefore, by Lemma 1,
p

I
= f

S
: (3)
Proof: Suppose the contrary. Since, by Lemma 1, the intermediary makes
no prot anyway, the seller would be able to deviate and set a lower f;which
would leave room for a Pareto improving oer by the intermediary which
would therefore be accepted by the buyer. Q.E.D.
Finally, we can also conclude that in stage 3 the seller must be indierent
between accepting and rejecting f

I
: Since upon acceptance she obtains f

I
after T=2 units of delay, while after rejection she expects f

S
after 1 + T=2
time units, this implies
f

I
= f

S
: (4)
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In stage 2, the intermediary obtains (p

I
  f

S
) = 0 by rejecting the
buyer's oer and proposing p

I
in stage 1.
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As we have seen before, if the
intermediary goes for renegotiation it must be successful and so he obtains

T
(p
B
  f

I
): Finally, if he accepts, he obtains p
B
  f

S
: Therefore,
p
a
B
  f

S
= 
T
(p
a
B
  f

I
); 
T
(p
r
B
  f

I
) = (p

I
  f

S
) = 0; (5)
so that p
a
B
makes the intermediary indierent between accepting the oer
and renegotiating f

S
; while p
r
B
makes him indierent between renegotiating
f

S
and rejecting the oer. Solving (5) yields
p
a
B
= f

S
1  
T+1
1  
T
; p
r
B
= f

S
: (6)
In stage 2, the buyer sets either p
B
= p
r
B
or p
B
= p
a
B
; depending on which
of these two prices maximizes his payo. By choosing p
B
= p
r
B
he provokes
renegotiation and obtains 
T
(1  p
r
B
); by choosing p
B
= p
a
B
he gets (1  p
a
B
)
right away. Thus
p

B
=
8
<
:
p
a
B
if p
a
B
 1  
T
(1  p
r
B
);
p
r
B
otherwise:
(7)
In stage 1, by Lemma 2, the intermediary's oer makes the buyer indif-
ferent between accepting and rejecting. Therefore
1  p

I
= max
h

T
(1  p
r
B
); 1  p
a
B
i
: (8)
Using the previous equations, this simplies to
1  f

S
= max
"

T
(1  f

S
); 1  f

S
1  
T+1
1  
T
#
: (9)
6
The oer, p

I
, must be accepted in equilibrium, since by stationarity, if it is optimal for
the agent to reject today he will never provoke renegotiation.Consequently, the subgame
is just like in the standard model and all oers are accepted in equilibrium.
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It is easy to see that the second term in the bracket on the r.h.s. cannot
yield a positive solution for f

S
: Therefore our candidate for the solution is
the one using the rst term. It can be veried that at this solution the rst
term is indeed exceeding the second. Note that this observation amounts to

T
(1  p
r
B
) > 1  p
a
B
; which proves the following result:
Lemma 3 If the buyer gets to make an oer he will always provoke renego-
tiation.
It is in fact the intermediary who forces this outcome by insisting on
renegotiation, whenever he expects it to succeed. Note that when he goes for
renegotiation the seller is on the defensive, she has to accept if she wants to
avoid further delay. When the buyer's oer is lower than f

S
, the agent chooses
to renegotiate f

S
in order to avoid a loss, while if the oer is better, it turns
out that the delay cost suered is more than compensated by his improved
bargaining position with respect to the seller. Observe also that this result
shows that, at least o the equilibrium path, having full commitment and
having innitely expensive renegotiation are not equivalent.
It is now straightforward to derive the solution for the parameters that
characterize the stationary equilibrium. By (3), (4), (6), (7) and (9) we
obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the subgame where the seller delegates bargaining, the
unique stationary equilibrium is characterized by the following values:
f

S
= p

I
=
1  
T+1
1  
T+2
; p

B
= p
r
B
= f

I
=
   
T+2
1  
T+2
; (10)
and
p
a
B
=

1  
T+1

2
(1  
T
) (1  
T+2
)
 1: (11)
When the seller employs a bargaining agent, the buyer has to pay p

I
for
the good. Note that this price is increasing in the time cost of renegotiation,
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T . For T = 0 it coincides with the price that would result from direct face-
to-face bargaining between the seller and the buyer. As T tends to innity,
p

I
approaches one.
2.4 The Gains from Delegation
In stage 0, the seller decides whether to delegate bargaining or to bargain
directly with the buyer. Hiring an intermediary involves a delay cost M of
time units and gives her the payo 
M
f

S
. By bargaining face-to-face with the
buyer she expects the payo 1=(1 + ) . Therefore, her gain from delegation
is
G(; T;M) =

M
(1  
T+1
)
1  
T+2
 
1
1 + 
: (12)
Note that @G=@T > 0, G(; 0;M) < 0 and G(;1;M) = 
M
  1=(1+ ), for
all  2 (0; 1) and M > 0: Therefore, by dening the cuto values
M

()   
ln(1 + )
ln 
; T

(M; )  ln
 
1  
M
  
M+1

2
  
M+1
  
M+2
!
= ln ; (13)
we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 Delegation is protable for the seller if and only if the time
cost of delegation M is suciently small and the time cost of renegotiation
T is suciently large. More specically, G(; T;M) > 0 if and only if M <
M

() and T > T

(M; ):
Figure 1 illustrates the situation for a given discount factor : The seller
delegates bargaining to the intermediary only if the parameters M and T
lie in region I. For parameter values in regions II and III he prefers to
bargain directly with the buyer. Note that 
M
is the surplus with delegation
that would result if full commitment were possible. In region III , where
M

() < M; delegation is simply more costly than the maximum benet
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-M
6
T
M

()
I
II
III
T

(M; )
j
Figure 1: Gains from Delegation
it could provide. For lower delegation costs, the issue is whether the rene-
gotiation cost is suciently high to create enough commitment power to
compensate for the price of delegation.
As the cost of delay vanishes, we can observe two eects. First, by deni-
tion, the cost of delegation tends to zero, so region III disappears. Second,
the minimum necessary commitment for protable delegation converges to
zero, so region II disappears too. That is,
lim
!1
M

() =1; lim
!1
T

(M; ) = 0: (14)
As a result, we have
lim
!1
G(; T;M) =
T
4 + 2T
: (15)
This means that, for  suciently close to unity, delegation is always more
protable for the seller than face-to-face bargaining.
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3 A Search Market
3.1 Direct Trade
In this section we extend our analysis to a simple search market environment
with a large number of potential buyers. The monopolistic seller, who owns a
single indivisible good, can either search by himself for a bargaining partner
or she can delegate search and bargaining to an intermediary. We begin by
studying the benchmark case without delegation. In this case, the seller is
matched randomly with one of the buyer with probability  2 (0; 1) per
period. She continues to bargain with this buyer until either an agreement
is reached or she meets another buyer. Thus, as in Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1985), the seller switches to another buyer with probability  whenever a
proposal is rejected.
More specically, we consider the following extensive form game. The
seller meets a potential buyer with probability  2 (0; 1) in each period.
When she is matched with a buyer, bargaining proceeds as follows:
Stage 1. The seller proposes some price p
S
. If the buyer accepts, the game
ends. Otherwise, with probability (1  ) stage 2 is entered after one
period. With probability  the seller is matched with another buyer
and stage 1 starts after one period.
Stage 2. The buyer proposes some price p
B
: If the seller accepts, the game
ends. Otherwise, with probability (1  ) stage 1 is entered after one
period with the same buyer. With probability  the seller is matched
with another buyer and stage 1 starts after one period.
It is now straightforward to derive the stationary equilibrium with direct
trade: In stage 1 the seller's proposal leaves the buyer indierent between
accepting and rejecting, and in stage 2 the buyer's proposal leaves the seller
indierent between accepting and rejecting. Therefore, we have that
1  p
S
= (1  )(1  p
B
); p
B
= p
S
: (16)
14
These two equations have the unique solution
p^
S
=
1  (1  )
1  
2
(1  )
; p^
B
=
(1  (1  ))
1  
2
(1  )
: (17)
The seller's ex ante payo from direct trade, v
D
S
, is therefore given by
v
D
S
= p^
S
+ (1  )v
D
S
; (18)
which yields
v
D
S
=

1  
2
(1  )
: (19)
Note that, in the limit as  ! 1 we have that v
D
S
= 1:
3.2 Delegated Search
To delegate search and bargaining, the seller contacts an intermediary. This
requires M time units. Then the game proceeds as follows:
Stage 0. The seller proposes a contract, f
S
; which requires the intermediary
to pay f
S
to her after any sale. The intermediary accepts or rejects.
If he rejects, the seller searches herself for a buyer and expects the
payo 
M
v
D
S
. In case he accepts, the intermediary starts searching
for a buyer. Per period he is matched with a potential buyer with
probability : After a match, stage 1 begins.
Stage 1: The intermediary proposes the price p
I
to the buyer. If the buyer
accepts, they trade and the game ends. Otherwise, with probability
1    the game proceeds to the next stage after one time unit. With
probability  the intermediary is matched with another buyer and stage
1 starts again after a delay of one period.
Stage 2: The buyer makes a counteroer p
B
. If the intermediary accepts, the
game ends. If the intermediary rejects, with probability 1  he returns
to stage 1 after one period with the same buyer. With probability 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the intermediary is matched with another buyer. In this case, stage 1
starts with the new buyer after one period. If the intermediary decides
to renegotiate the existing contract f; stage 3 is entered after T=2 time
units.
Stage 3: The intermediary proposes the contract f
I
. If the seller accepts,
the good is sold T=2 periods later at the price p
B
and the intermediary
pays f
I
to seller. If the seller rejects, the old contract remains valid
and stage 1 is entered after a delay of 1 + T=2 time units.
As in the bilateral monopoly model, we look for an equilibrium in sta-
tionary strategies, described by the six-tuple (f

S
; p

I
; p

B
; p
a
B
; p
r
B
; f

I
): Observe
that Lemmas 1 and 2 directly apply to the current model. Consequently, we
have that
f

I
= f

S
= p

I
: (20)
Similarly, the analysis of stage 2 coincides with that of the bilateral
monopoly, since the intermediary is indierent between making a counter-
proposal to the same buyer or making a rst oer to the new buyer. Thus
equations (5) - (7) apply without any modication.
In stage 1, however, the threat of competition from another buyer makes
the buyer more inclined to accept the intermediary's proposal. The inter-
mediary's oer makes the buyer indierent between accepting and rejecting
if
1  p

I
= (1  )max[
T
(1  p
r
B
); 1  p
a
B
]: (21)
Eectively, the equilibrium conditions for the search market environment dif-
fer from the bilateral monopoly case only in that the above equation replaces
condition (8).
The solution of the equilibrium conditions yields the following result:
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Proposition 3 When the seller delegates search and bargaining, the unique
stationary equilibrium is characterized by the following values:
f

S
= p

I
=
1  (1  )
T+1
1  (1  )
T+2
; p

B
= p
r
B
= f

I
=
   (1  )
T+2
1  (1  )
T+2
; (22)
and
p
a
B
=

1  
T+1
 
1  (1  )
T+1

(1  
T
) (1  (1  )
T+2
)
 1: (23)
Notice that (22) and (23) coincide with (10) and (11) in the limiting case
 = 0. As  is increased, the price that the buyer has to pay, p

I
, also becomes
higher. Note also that, since 
T
(1   p
r
B
) > 1   p
a
B
; the buyer's proposal p

B
always triggers renegotiation just as in the bilateral monopoly.
3.3 The Gains from Delegated Search
We now evaluate the protability of delegating search and bargaining. At
the end of stage 0, the seller's payo from employing the intermediary is
v
I
S
= f

S
+ (1  )v
I
S
: (24)
By Proposition 3, this equals
v
I
S
=
[1  (1  )
T+1
]
[1  (1  )
T+2
][(1  (1  )]
: (25)
The seller's gain from delegation, H(; ; T;M) = 
M
v
I
S
  v
D
S
; can there-
fore be written as
H(; ; T;M) =

M
(1  (1  )
T+1
)
[1  (1  )
T+2
][(1  (1  )]
 

1  
2
(1  )
: (26)
Similarly to the bilateral monopoly model, we observe that @H=@T > 0,
H(; ; 0;M) < 0 and H(; ;1;M) = [
M
=(1  (1 ))]  [=(1  
2
(1 
17
))], for all  > 0;  2 (0; 1) and M > 0: Thus, we can dene
~
M(; )  ln
 
1  (1  )
1  
2
(1  )
!
/ ln ; (27)
~
T (M; ; )  ln
0
@
1  
M
+ (1  )


M+2
  

(1  ) [   
M
+ (1  ) (
M+2
  
2
)]
1
A
= ln 
to obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 Delegation is protable for the seller if and only if the time
cost of delegation M is suciently small and the time cost of renegotiation
T is suciently large. More specically, H(; ; T;M) > 0 if and only if
M <
~
M(; ) and T >
~
T (M; ; ):
Let us compare this result with Proposition 2. First, note that
lim
!0
~
M(; ) = M

(); lim
!0
~
T (M; ; ) = T

(M; ): (28)
As search becomes totally inecient, even though the gain H decreases to
zero, the cuto values for protable delegation become identical to those in
the bilateral bargaining model.
Next, it can be shown that @
~
M (; )=@ < 0 and that for M <
~
M(; ),
@
~
T (M; ; )=@ > 0: This implies that, for  2 (0; 1); in Figure 1 the
~
M
schedule lies to the left of M

and that
~
T lies above T

: Thus - ceteris
paribus - the scope for intermediation in a search market is smaller than in
a bilateral monopoly. The intuition is that competition among the buyers
creates a sort of commitment eect that tends to render commitment through
intermediation redundant. Indeed, we have
lim
!1
~
M(; ) = 0; lim
!1
~
T (M; ; ) =1: (29)
Intermediation is never protable if search is suciently ecient! In a highly
competitive environment there is no role for intermediation.
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H

1
 0:1
0:0
0:1
H(0:1; ; 5; 1)
H(0:2; ; 5; 1)
H(0:3; ; 5; 1)
(30)
Figure 2: The Function H(; ; T;M)
The previous statement can be qualied by examining the equilibrium be-
havior as frictions disappear. In a `frictionless' search market intermediation
is not protable because
lim
!1
H(; ; T;M) = 0: (31)
The intuition for this observation is that the seller is able to appropriate the
entire surplus through direct trade when switching from one buyer to another
involves no delay cost. This is in contrast with the bilateral monopoly, where
in the limit as  ! 1 we have G(; T;M)! T=(4 + 2T ) > 0:
Figure 2 illustrates our ndings. It shows how the gain H from delegated
search and bargaining depends on : The delegation cost and the renegotia-
tion cost are xed at M = 1 and T = 5; respectively. The gure shows that
for  = 0:3 delegation is never protable. For  = 0:2 and  = 0:1; however,
there is a critical value 0 <



< 1 such that there are gains from delegation
if and only if



<  < 1:
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4 Conclusion
By employing a bargaining agent a player may increase his share of the avail-
able surplus even when the delegation contract is subject to renegotiation.
We obtain this conclusion from a strategic model of bargaining which explic-
itly takes into account that the exchange of proposals and counterproposals
is time consuming. In such a framework, naturally, renegotiating an exist-
ing contract also requires time. It is exactly this time cost which prevents
a full elimination of the commitment eect of delegation. Importantly, this
eect does not vanish when the delay costs of negotiations become negligi-
ble. Indeed, when the players' common discount factor is suciently large,
delegation is always protable in a bilateral monopoly.
This observation casts some doubt on much of the literature on contract
design and renegotiation, which typically concludes that employing a third
party generates no commitment eect if the delegation contract is not irre-
vocable. Our results show that this conclusion may no longer be valid when
the process of contract design and renegotiation is described by a strategic
bargaining model.
The strategic bargaining approach can easily be imbedded in a market
environment. This allows us to address the question of which market con-
ditions favor the use of intermediation. We study a simple search market
model and show that the gain from delegating search and bargaining disap-
pears when search is suciently ecient. In a highly competitive market a
trader cannot increase his share of the surplus through precommitment. This
is in line with the Walrasian paradigm in which intermediation plays no role
because all trade occurs at a centralized location.
In our model only one of the bargainers has the option of employing a
delegate. In principle, this setting can be extended by allowing also the
other party to hire an agent. In this case, however, the derivation of equi-
librium becomes more complicated because two-sided delegation leads to a
20
four-person bargaining game. Nonetheless, the consideration of two-sided
delegation would be interesting not only in the bilateral monopoly but also
in the random matching model. We conjecture that the side of the market
with higher search costs also has higher incentives to resort to intermediation.
21
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